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What is a Mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences 
 
Abstract 
 
After a decade of intense debate about mechanisms, there is still no consensus characterization.  In 
this paper we argue for a characterization that applies widely to mechanisms across the sciences.  We 
examine and defend our disagreements with the major current contenders for characterizations of 
mechanisms.  Ultimately, we indicate that the major contenders can all sign up to our characterization. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since Bechtel and Richardson’s 1993 book, there has been nearly two decades of debate 
on the right characterisation of a mechanism, intensifying since MDC’s controversial 
2000 paper.  The main contenders are: 
 
Machamer, Darden and Craver: ‘Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.’  (Machamer, 
Darden and Craver 2000 p3.) 
Glennan: ‘A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, 
invariant, change-relating generalizations.’ (Glennan 2002b pS344.) 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen: ‘A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena.’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 p423.) 
 
After small changes of detail (see Bechtel and Richardson’s original 1993, Glennan’s 
original 1996, Machamer 2004, Craver 2007, and Glennan 2011), these broad  
characterisations remain in use by their original advocate(s), and many others. 
 
In this paper, we will defend a characterization that gives an understanding of what is 
common to mechanisms in all fields.  We disagree with elements of all of the major 
characterizations above, and argue for: ‘A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of 
entities and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for the 
phenomenon.’ 
 
This project is important for two reasons.  First, it is important to the broad question of 
whether scientific method is disunified, or not (see Glennan 2010).  Different scientific 
disciplines share many methodological concerns, including causal explanation, causal 
inference and causal modelling, which commonly use mechanisms.  It is our contention 
that we have produced a widely applicable understanding of mechanisms, that is of use in 
understanding what these different disciplines share, methodologically.  This is 
complementary to the alternative project of describing what is distinctive about the kinds 
of mechanisms used in a particular domain.  (See Steel; and Torres p240 for 
methodological disagreement.)  Surface differences are methodologically important, but 
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shouldn't be allowed to obscure what is common.  Indeed, we cannot properly understand 
the differences without also seeing the similarities.  We offer what is common to 
mechanisms, which different fields can flesh out with their distinctive methodological 
needs. 
 
Second, these particular methodological debates and others need a consensus account of 
mechanisms.  Philosophers and scientists are attempting to use mechanisms to illuminate 
causal explanation, inference and modelling, as well as the metaphysics of causality (see 
Glennan 1996; Steel; Leuridan and Weber; Broadbent; Gillies).  These debates are 
impeded by lack of a consensus account, in spite of a great deal of consensus now 
existing within the mechanisms literature.  To develop an understanding of the problems 
of causal explanation, inference and modelling that the sciences share, it is vital to 
understand what is common in the use of mechanisms across the sciences.  The problems 
shared by different fields are just as important to recognise as the methodological 
differences (see Glennan 2005 p462).  Many mechanistic explanations are built using 
components from multiple fields (see Craver 2007, Russo 2009, Illari and Williamson 
2010).  Debate on using mechanisms in causal inference includes both biomedical and 
social sciences (see for example Steel; Gillies).  Such examples strongly indicate that 
mechanisms in general share a great deal.  Finally, if there is no widely applicable 
account of mechanisms, there is no possibility of a widely applicable mechanistic 
approach to the metaphysics of causality, so our work is also of interest to that debate.  
We will assist all these debates by developing a consensus account of a mechanism that 
they can use. 
 
We are interested in mechanisms themselves.  As Craver claims, there is a sense of ontic 
explanation: mechanisms explain phenomena in the sense that their presence produces 
the phenomenon (2007 pp27-8).  But epistemic explanation is also important, as Bechtel 
claims, where the description of the mechanism explains the phenomenon (2008 p16).  
But both ontic and epistemic mechanistic explanation require real mechanisms.  Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen write: ‘mechanisms are real systems in nature’ (2005 p424-5), and 
Bechtel agrees that epistemic explanation is parasitic on there being real mechanisms in 
the world to describe (private communication).  So Bechtel and Craver can hold, with us, 
that examining mechanistic explanation tells you about mechanisms themselves, and so 
we will move freely between claims about mechanistic explanation and claims about 
mechanisms themselves.   
 
Although our characterization is close to MDC's and Craver's, in the next section, S2, we 
explain why we do not include certain elements of the current characterizations.  In S3 
we defend our characterization.  We will show that, correctly understood, it applies to the 
mechanisms that scientists discover and use in explanation and causal inference.  Existing 
accounts of mechanisms have been developed in the light of the biomedical sciences 
(MDC, 2000) and psychology (Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008).  We will use astrophysical 
mechanisms to demonstrate the wide applicability of our account. In S4 we will take up 
the question of what is not a mechanism on this account.  In S5 we conclude.  We see our 
project as consistent with those of the main contenders, and we briefly indicate why we 
think they should have no serious objections to our account. 
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2 What mechanisms aren’t  
 
With broad applicability in mind, we do not characterise a mechanism as a structure 
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen) or a system (Glennan).  Unless read so weakly as to mean 
almost nothing, the idea of structure implies some level of inflexibility.  This seems at 
odds with Bechtel's latest work (Bechtel and Wright 2009; Bechtel 2010, 2008; but 
compare Bechtel 2007 p275).  A system is more dynamic and more flexible than a 
structure, but still implies a level of internal coherence that not all mechanisms show.  As 
Darden notes (2006 p281), some mechanisms make their own entities as they go, such as 
the mechanism of protein synthesis where mRNA is made when needed and broken down 
afterwards.  Further, many mechanisms are complex, but they can also be simple.1  The 
mechanism of thermal dissociation of the diatomic iodine molecule in the vapour phase 
seems too simple to be called either a system or a structure.  The stretching vibration just 
gets more and more energetic until there is enough energy to rupture the bond between 
two atoms, and they fly apart.   
 
Unsurprisingly, astrophysical mechanisms are often relatively stable and structured.  But 
violent sudden change from an existing structure or system to a different one is also 
possible, as with supernovae.  Thus even for astrophysical mechanisms, it is best to avoid 
‘structure’ or ‘system’ in the characterization of a mechanism. 
 
Glennan is initially committed to all mechanisms being systems (2002b p128, p129; 
2009a). In Glennan (2009b p323) he allows that there is no 'mechanism qua system' for a 
baseball breaking a window.  In Glennan (2010, see especially pp260-1) he develops an 
account of 'ephemeral mechanisms', where the configuration of parts isn't stable, as it is 
in a system.  In Glennan (2008, see especially p283) he calls for an account of a possible 
third kind, emergent mechanisms, for cases where phenomena produced by mechanisms 
depend on the properties of and relations between their parts, but standard mechanistic 
strategies such as functional localization are not very successful.  We agree that these are 
all mechanisms, but are inclined to treat these differences as positions on a continuum, 
not differences in kinds of mechanism. 
 
We also drop MDC’s ‘start or set-up’ or ‘finish or termination conditions’.  Craver drops 
this without explanation (2007), while Darden (2006) and Machamer (2004) retain it.  
This element can be read very lightly, but it is better removed, because 'start' and 'finish' 
conditions are not even an aspect of all of our mechanism descriptions, far less of all 
mechanisms.  They are pragmatic aspects of the descriptions we give of some  
mechanisms – but not all.  Cell mechanisms such as the Krebs cycle are cyclical.  They 
are continuous, having no real start or end.  Bechtel (2009) notes this for other 
mechanisms.  For continuous mechanisms, understanding that there is no tidy start or end 
is very important.  Further, even some mechanisms that are neatly described in terms of 
start and finish conditions do not themselves have start and finish conditions.  So while 
                                                 
1
 For this reason, we do not adopt Torres (p247). At 'Mechanisms and Causality' conference, Kent, 
2009, Glennan clearly withdrew ‘complex’ from his characterization.   
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some mechanisms might have a natural descriptive starting point – we might start the 
description of the formation of stars with the gravitational accretion of dark matter in a 
halo – we should not enforce a start and end-point with a requirement in the 
characterization of a mechanism. 
 
We follow MDC and Bechtel in not requiring modularity.  Dynamical systems and 
systems biology explanations are precisely aimed at describing systems that are largely 
non-modular, and we do not wish to rule them out as mechanisms.  It may appear that we 
disagree with Woodward.  However, on closer examination, Woodward is talking only 
about representations of mechanisms: ‘(MECH) a necessary condition for a 
representation to be an acceptable model of a mechanism is that the representation (i) 
describe an organized or structured set of parts or components, where (ii) the behavior of 
each component is described by a generalization that is invariant under interventions, and 
where (iii) the generalizations governing each component are also independently 
changeable, and where (iv) the representation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) 
and (iii), the overall output of the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the input to 
each component and changes in the components themselves.’ (Woodward S375, 
emphasis added. Compare Darden 2006 p279.)  But Woodward is clear here that he is 
concerned with representations or models, not mechanisms themselves.  We agree that 
our representations or models of mechanisms should be modular as far as possible.  Such 
a representation will certainly make prediction and intervention easier.  But where this is 
not possible, a non-modular representation will have to do.  Neither mechanisms 
themselves, nor all mechanism descriptions, will be modular.  Since Woodward’s 
primary concern is representations, not mechanisms themselves, we will put his views 
aside for the rest of the paper.  Thus, we do not use Woodward's ideas in the 
characterization of a mechanism itself. 
 
We will move on now to defending our positive characterization of a mechanism.  This is 
our characterization of the consensus elements of mechanisms.  Here, disagreements are 
more subtle, but they are important if the characterization is to be widely applicable and 
so useful to other debates on method or metaphysics. 
 
 
3 Our characterization of mechanisms 
 
All mechanistic explanations begin with the identification of a phenomenon or 
phenomena to be explained, proceed by decomposition into the entities and activities 
functionally relevant to the phenomenon, and give the organization of entities and 
activities by which they produce the phenomenon. (See Darden 2006, Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2008.)  Mechanism discovery is messy and iterative, but always involves 
finding these three elements.   
 
This is widely known, so all mechanisms share the three elements found in the process of 
mechanism discovery.  Even astrophysical mechanisms are grouped by the phenomena 
they produce.  Scientists aim to give a detailed account of how the phenomenon is 
produced by entities and activities.  Entities include both massive bodies such as stars and 
5 
galaxies, and fundamental particles such as quarks, photons, neutrons and neutrinos; 
while activities tend to involve movement and energy changes.  Organization is vital: 
threshold effects are common, and feedback effects, often associated with biological 
mechanisms, are not uncommon.  Background theory, particularly General Relativity, is 
important to astrophysical mechanisms in a way not paralleled by all mechanisms, 
because relevant organization can include details of background spacetime geometry. 
 
Our favoured characterisation is a synthesis of the views of the main contenders. 
 
‘A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such a 
way that they are responsible for the phenomenon.’ 
 
In the following subsections, we take each of the three elements here and argue for them: 
responsible for the phenomenon (S3a), entities and activities (S3b), and organization 
(S3c).  We have covered some elements in more detail elsewhere (See [References 
removed for the purposes of blind review]). 
 
 
3a Responsible for the phenomenon 
 
There are three reasons why we follow Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005 p422) in saying 
mechanisms are 'responsible for a phenomenon'.  The first reason is the importance of the 
phenomenon for mechanistic explanation.  Mechanistic explanation succeeds when the 
mechanism discovered and described is the mechanism responsible for the phenomenon.  
If no unified mechanism can be found for that phenomenon, the phenomenon is 
redescribed to make it susceptible of mechanistic explanation – what Bechtel and 
Richardson call ‘reconstituting the phenomenon’ (1993).  This is to say that mechanisms 
are functionally individuated by their phenomena.2  However, we avoid Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen’s ‘performing a function’ in our characterization.  In wider philosophical 
and scientific debate, ‘function’ is a loaded concept, usually involving deliberate design 
or natural selection, while the function of a mechanism requires only something like 
‘characteristic activity’. 
 
This is important for application to astrophysical mechanisms.  Even in the absence of 
natural selection or deliberate design, spectacular phenomena such as supernovae are 
typed by the mechanisms that produce them.3  In a supernova of Type II the star explodes 
but leaves a collapsed black hole, neutron star or white dwarf behind.  The core has little 
                                                 
2
 At least partially.  There seem to be other ways to individuate mechanisms that produce the same 
phenomenon, such as in terms of the entities or activities involved, and an examination of whether such 
ways can always be explained away in terms of functional individuation is a complex issue we reserve for 
further work.  At 'Mechanisms and Causality' conference, Kent 2009, both Darden and Craver called the 
functional individuation of mechanisms ‘Glennan’s Law’, as he was the first to recognise this (see for 
example his 1996). 
3  Mechanisms are individuated by their phenomena, and phenomena are also individuated by their 
mechanisms.  This is not circular, because it happens iteratively over time.  At the beginning, a mechanism 
is not needed to individuate a phenomenon, but the characterisation of the phenomenon may be further 
refined when a mechanism or mechanisms are discovered.  See Darden 2008 p960. 
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nuclear material left, and is supported by electron degeneracy pressure (when compressed 
and cooled, the velocity of all electrons can only fall so low because two electrons can’t 
occupy the same quantum state).  But the core accumulates mass from the shell.  If it 
never reaches the Chandrasekhar mass, it will collapse to a white dwarf.  But when the 
core mass is larger than the Chandrasekhar mass, electron degeneracy pressure is not 
enough, and it collapses further.  When neutron degeneracy pressure starts the bounce, 
many neutrinos escape suddenly, carrying away an enormous amount of energy, leaving a 
neutron star behind but blowing away the rest of the mass of the star.  Supernovae of type 
I are different – they are giant nuclear explosions.  In a supernova of Type Ia 
(characterized by absence of hydrogen lines in their spectra), the star explodes 
completely, leaving nothing behind.  The star still has nuclear material, and during 
collapse increasing density and pressure rapidly increases nuclear reactions, which 
release energy.  This stops collapse well before neutron star density, blowing the star 
completely apart.  Even here we redescribe and regroup phenomena, paying more 
attention to some differences than others, when we discover that there is more than one 
mechanism for supernovae.   
 
'Responsible for a phenomenon' expresses this.  Secondly, it captures the diversity of 
things that mechanisms do.  Mechanisms carry out tasks, such as regulation or control 
and exhibit behaviours, such as growth.  They also maintain stable states.  Homeostatic 
mechanisms, such as those that maintain human body temperature at 37°, do this.  Such a 
state might even be a standing capacity of a system.  For example, many cells have the 
capacity to metabolise lactose, although they do not do so unless glucose is unavailable.  
At a higher degree of abstraction, the metabolic mechanism is responsible for more than 
one phenomenon: metabolising glucose normally, and metabolising lactose in the 
absence of glucose.  There is no significant disagreement on this diversity (Darden 2006 
p273, 2008 p959; Glennan 2002a p126-7). 
 
Thirdly, 'responsibility' implies something counterfactual.  The phenomenon can be 
something actual, or something modal – such as the capacity of a cell to metabolise 
lactose, even if lactose is never encountered.  See Glennan (1997) for a similar 
interpretation of capacities.  However, the mechanism does not determine the 
phenomenon, because some mechanisms may be indeterministic.  Nor should a 
characterization of mechanisms require that they produce 'regular changes' as MDC do, 
but Machamer (2004 p37, footnote 1) drops.  Compare Darden (2008 p964) and Glennan 
(2010 p257).  Mechanisms might not produce change at all, such as homeostatic 
mechanisms.4  They may or may not be regular.  To give Craver's example, in the 
mechanism of neurotransmitter release only 10-20% of action potentials eventuate in 
release events.  And release events can occur without action potentials (Craver 2007 
p26).  But dropping explicit reference to regularity does not imply that mechanisms in 
general do not have to exhibit some form of regularity or stability.  Some far weaker form 
of regularity or stability is already present in the idea of mechanisms being responsible 
for the phenomenon.  Our formulation captures the importance, diversity and various 
forms of stability of what mechanisms do. 
                                                 
4
  We reject Tabery’s ‘interactivity’ because it also requires change (Tabery 2004 p12).  But see 
Tabery (2009) on using mechanisms to explain difference, rather than similarity. 
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3b Entities and activities 
 
There is consensus that mechanistic explanation involves decomposition, and 
mechanisms have two distinct kinds of constituents.  We have ‘entities’, ‘parts’ and 
‘component parts’ used for the bits and pieces of the mechanism, and ‘activities’, 
‘interactions’ and ‘component operations’ for what those bits and pieces do.  
Astrophysical mechanisms have both entities and activities: ‘An important mechanism 
for producing X-rays from Solar System objects is charge exchange, which occurs when 
a highly ionized atom in the solar wind collides with a neutral atom (gas or solid) and 
captures an electron, usually in an excited state. As the ion relaxes, it radiates an X-ray 
characteristic of the wind ion. Lines produced by charge exchange with solar wind ions 
such as C V, C VI, O VII, O VIII and Ne IX have all been detected with Chandra and 
XMM-Newton [new space observatories]…’. (Santos-Lleo et al. p998.)  Putting this 
together with mechanisms for supernovae above, entities include: electron, proton, 
neutron, neutrino, star, neutron star, white dwarf, black hole, core, gas, x-ray, ionised 
atom, solar wind, neutral atom.  Activities include: charge exchange, colliding, relaxing, 
radiating, collapse, bounce, heating e.g. neutrino heating, electron capture, the nuclear 
fusion that creates heavier elements in stars, and so on. 
 
For wide applicability, care is needed in understanding entities and activities.  Many of 
the following points are agreed by the main contenders, but their work is prone to 
misinterpretation. Fascinatingly, astrophysical mechanisms deal simultaneously with the 
vanishingly small and the staggeringly enormous.  What happens in a supernova depends 
on properties of the massive, such as whether the star’s core reaches the Chandrasekhar 
mass or not – which is approximately 1.2-1.4 solar masses.  On the other hand, it is 
electron degeneracy pressure which supports a white dwarf, and this depends on the fact 
that electrons are fermions, i.e. they obey Pauli’s Exclusion Principle, which means that 
there are limits on the minimum energy that more than two electrons in the same place 
can have.  The end state of a star depends on the interplay of these very different kinds of 
factors, so there can be no a priori restriction according to size on the entities and 
activities of a mechanism.  Further, mechanistic explanation might not always be in terms 
of smaller parts.  Darden provides a good example: ‘finding the mechanism of 
segregation of genes did not require decomposing genes into their parts but required 
finding the wholes, the chromosomes, on which the parts, the genes, ride.’ (Darden 2006 
p109, see also Darden 2008 p961.)  Mechanistic explanation is not always about the little 
explaining the big.  Finally, the parts of mechanisms vary a great deal in their robustness.  
Some entities remain comparatively unchanged over time, but others are more transient, 
such as the mRNA that is made from DNA, used as a template to make a protein, and 
then broken down again straight away.  Activities can also be local and fragile, such as 
the mutation or recombination that creates the diversity of strains of HIV that makes it so 
difficult to eradicate.  Glennan seems committed to a high degree of robustness in parts in 
earlier work (2002b, 2009a) – although he notes that the interactions of parts is 'not 
exceptionless' – but has relaxed this somewhat now (2010).   
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MDC have metaphysical arguments for entities and activities.  Here, we put these aside to 
focus on descriptive reasons for preferring a particular characterization of the 
components of a mechanism.  We prefer MDC's language of activities and entities for 
two main reasons: it offers a powerful resistance to entity-bias, and it allows variability in 
the arity of the relation between entities.  We take these points in turn. 
 
Many approaches to scientific ontology give entities priority, treating what entities do as 
either reducible to entities themselves, or metaphysically dubious.  But descriptively, 
activities and entities are equally important to mechanisms: neither has priority.  MDC 
write: ‘There are kinds of changing just as there are kinds of entities. These different 
kinds are recognized by science and are basic to the ways that things work.’ (MDC 2000 
p5.)  Machamer adds: ‘Activities can be abstracted and referred to and identified 
independently of any particular entity, and sometimes even without reference to any 
entity at all.’ (Machamer 2004 p30.  See also Darden 2006 p277.)  A bunch of entities 
engaging in a certain set of activities will produce something different from the same 
bunch of entities engaging in another set of activities.  A buyer and seller haggling over 
the price may lead to a sale.  The same two people chatting about the weather will not.  
Further, although entities and activities are always equally important in that they must 
both be present to produce the phenomenon, in explaining different kinds of phenomena 
entities are sometimes more interesting than the activities, and vice versa.  In protein 
synthesis, entities are very different from each other and their detailed structure matters a 
great deal.  But in many dynamical systems and systems biology explanations, the 
entities are relatively similar to each other and the activities are vital to produce the 
phenomenon. 
 
This is consistent with Bechtel's and Glennan’s considered views (Glennan 2009b p321), 
but the rhetorical impact of the language matters for scientists and philosophers 
elsewhere using an account of mechanisms in other debates.  MDC's entities and 
activities offer the strongest rhetorical resistance to a default entity-bias. 
 
Our second reason is that variability in the arity of the relation between entities is more 
important than has been recognised, and is nicely captured by MDC’s language.  
Consider the alteratives: capacities are unary (1-ary) relations since a capacity attaches to 
an entity, although one entity can have many capacities (note Darden 2008 p963).  
Glennan's 'interaction' implies a relation between at least two entities, so interactions are 
binary (2-ary) at least.5  Bechtel and Abrahamsen write: 'Each component operation 
involves at least one component part’ (2005 p424), which seems to allow either unary, 
binary, 3-ary and so on.  The mapping of entities to activities can be unary, as in a bond 
breaking, involving no other entity; binary, as in a promoter binding to a strand of DNA; 
but it can also be 3-ary, 4-ary and so on (See Darden 2008 p964).  The activity of 
transcription involves DNA, the newly created mRNA, and various regulation and 
control enzymes, while more highly abstract activities such as equilibrating, or osmosis 
(Darden 2006 p277) may involve very many entities, of the same or different kinds, or be 
such that it hard to decide on any very clearly defined entity that engages in the activity. 
 
                                                 
5 As Tabery 2004 notes.  We thank Glennan for pressing us on this point. 
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Bechtel (2008) examines extensively the importance of mapping entities to activities (his 
component parts and component operations) in mechanism discovery, pointing out that it 
is often this mapping that allows us to identify the working parts of a mechanism.  So we 
had better get the arity of the relation right.  But Bechtel ties operations too closely to 
parts: ‘We use the term operation rather than activity because we want to draw attention 
to the involvement of parts’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 p423, footnote 5).  The arity 
of the relation between entities allowed by activities is unrestricted, covering all this.  
This is the best descriptive reason to favour entities and activities.  
 
In summary, mechanisms have two kinds of parts.  We prefer 'entities' and 'activities' 
because they have the right arity, and rhetorical advantages for avoiding entity-bias.  
Entities can be of widely varying sizes, in some cases the big is used to explain the small, 
and some mechanisms involve comparatively fragile entities and activities. 
  
 
3c Organization 
 
Organization is the least controversial element in any characterization of mechanisms, 
present in the characterizations of MDC and Bechtel and Abrahamsen, and discussed  
explicitly by Glennan elsewhere (see 2005, 2002a).  We think it worth the emphasis of 
putting it in the characterization, but consider Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s ‘orchestrated 
functioning’ too strong.  It suggests a tightly integrated form of organization that exists in 
highly evolved or designed systems, but not everywhere. 
 
How to understand organization is not much discussed, and is far from trivial.  What is 
organization so that it can reasonably be regarded as an element of all mechanisms?  
Here, we examine this, and argue that organization is not confined to complex biological 
mechanisms by showing its importance to astrophysical mechanisms.  These exhibit 
complex forms of organization requiring investigation by numerical simulation, such as 
homeostasis, equilibrium and feedback. 
 
Organization is the final element in the production of the phenomenon.  The same entities 
and activities organized differently will produce something different.  A group of 
organisms engaged in feeding, mating and dying will do something different if they are 
subject to a common selection pressure – a new predator, or bout of cold weather – than 
if they are not.  Organization most generally is whatever relations between the entities 
and activities discovered produce the phenomenon of interest: when activities and entities 
each do something and do something together to produce the phenomenon.6 
 
In mechanistic explanation, organization is analogous to initial conditions in laws-based 
explanation.  Laws and the entities they govern explain nothing until initial conditions are 
specified: Newton’s laws do not tell us the movements of the planets until their initial 
positions and velocities are specified.  In the mechanistic approach organization gives the 
ongoing conditions that allow the entities and activities to produce the phenomenon.  
                                                 
6  We have compared organization in natural selection, and in protein synthesis elsewhere 
[Reference removed for the purposes of blind review]. 
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‘Ongoing’ is important.  Initial conditions for laws matter only at the beginning, while 
organization matters throughout the operation of a mechanism.  Further, organization is 
not independent of the activities and entities and ongoing operation of a mechanism.  
Organization might affect which activities and entities are involved, while the operation 
of a mechanism might alter the organizational structure.  Evolution of a group of 
organisms subject to a common selection pressure might alter how widely dispersed those 
organisms need to be to be subject to that common selection pressure. 
 
This approach implies, correctly, that it is an empirical question what forms of 
organization are important for particular domains, so that the only other informative 
thing that can be said about organization is to discuss examples.  Organization comes in 
many forms, more or less important for different kinds of mechanism.  Spatial and 
temporal organization is vital to such cases as protein synthesis.  (Darden 2006, Craver 
2007.)  But other forms of organization can be instantiated by spatiotemporally located 
mechanisms.  Complex forms of organization such as homeostasis, equilibrium, feedback 
and self-organization are vital for the production of the phenomena studied by complex 
and dynamical systems.  (See Bechtel 2006 p33, p39; Mitchell; and possibly Glennan 
2008.)  Quantitative description of dynamical organization is often vital.  For example, in 
simulating supernovae, mass is standardly being lost from the star while mass is 
accumulated in the star core.  Quantitative simulation over time is needed to see whether 
the Chandrasekhar mass is reached.  In this way we allow organization to capture 
necessary elements of what Bechtel calls 'dynamical mechanistic explanation'. (See 
Bechtel 2008, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2009, 2010).  Each of these forms of organization 
also lies on a spectrum from less organized to increasingly organized.  Unsurprisingly, 
then, organization in its most general form – when activities and entities each do 
something and do something together to produce the phenomenon – itself comes in a 
(multidimensional) spectrum of increasingly complex organization.  Whichever form of 
organization is most important to the production of a particular phenomenon depends on 
the empirical world.  Our world seems to involve different forms of organization, more or 
less complex, in different cases.  In the simplest cases organization might be simple or 
trivial, but it is still present. 
 
Use of numerical simulation is a good indicator of complexity of organization, and 
simulations are a standard tool for discovering astrophysical mechanisms.  They often 
reveal complex forms of organization usually associated with biological mechanisms 
such as feedback.  Simulation of how the first stars formed tend to suggest they formed 
on their own, which leads to the question: how did galaxies form?  Further simulations 
suggest: ‘Some of the feedback processes described above that affect the formation of 
individual stars also influence primordial star formation on large scales. The enormous 
fluxes of ionizing radiation and H2-dissociating Lyman–Werner radiation emitted by 
massive population III stars dramatically influence their surroundings, heating and 
ionizing the gas within a few kiloparsecs of the progenitor and destroying the H2 within a 
somewhat larger region. Moreover, the Lyman–Werner radiation emitted by the first stars 
could propagate across cosmological distances, allowing the buildup of a pervasive 
Lyman–Werner background radiation field. The effect of radiation from the first stars on 
their local surroundings has important implications for the numbers and types of 
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population III stars that form. The photoheating of gas in the minihaloes hosting 
population III.1 stars drives strong outflows, lowering the density of the gas in the 
minihaloes and delaying subsequent star formation by up to 100 Myr … . Furthermore, 
neighbouring minihaloes may be photoevaporated, delaying star formation in such 
systems as well. The photodissociation of molecules by Lyman–Werner photons emitted 
from local star-forming regions will, in general, act to delay star formation by destroying 
the main coolants that allow the gas to collapse and form stars.’ (Bromm et al. p51.) 
 
Successful simulations are often very difficult: ‘The simulations, starting from 
cosmological initial conditions, are just now approaching the resolution and physical 
realism required to investigate whether atomic cooling haloes fulfil the criteria for a first 
galaxy as defined above. Quite generically, in such models, the first generation of stars 
forms before galaxies do, and feedback effects from the first stars are expected to play a 
key role in determining the initial conditions for the formation of the first galaxies.’ 
(Bromm et al. p52.)  Astrophysicists want to reproduce phenomena using physically 
realistic parameters, and only then do they think they have an empirical result.  
Investigation of organization by means of simulation is not the sole preserve of the life 
sciences. 
 
We have now defended our characterization of a mechanism, argued for its wide 
application, including to the case of astrophysical mechanisms.  We have indicated where 
we disagree with the main contenders while emphasizing that there is a core of agreement 
which we capture.  Very different scientific work in different fields aims to find and 
describe the entities and activities of their domain, their organization, and the phenomena 
they are responsible for.  This discovery process is messy and iterative.  It takes serious 
empirical work to correctly delimit the phenomena, and that description determines what 
activities, entities and organization will be looked for; while what activities, entities and 
organization are found affect the description of the phenomena.   
 
We will now show that our characterisation of mechanism is not so broad that it captures 
non-mechanisms. 
 
 
4 What isn’t a mechanism 
 
In this section, we examine some things produced in this messy process of discovery that 
are sometimes called mechanisms – perhaps erroneously – to further illuminate our 
account of mechanisms. 
 
Case 1: The description is too partial 
 
Sometimes we have a scientific advance, but the description of the mechanism for the 
phenomenon is still partial.  Consider the various possible forms of memory that have at 
some point been phenomenally dissociated: long term versus short term memory, 
working memory, episodic versus semantic memory, and non-explicit memory including 
various forms of priming.  There may be separate mechanisms producing these 
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phenomena, but we are not yet even in a position to guess how many mechanisms there 
are.  We have a better description of the phenomenon to be explained, and only finding 
the underlying mechanisms will show that there really are separate mechanisms.  
Mechanism discovery is messy and gradual, so there will be no sharp line between partial 
and full descriptions of mechanisms.  The crucial point is where scientists have good 
reason to suppose they have got hold of the actual mechanism operating.  Before that, the 
description might be so partial that it does not pick out a mechanism, and the explanation 
might not succeed. 
 
Case 2: There is too much idealization 
 
Models are built using assumptions.  These are necessary for enough simplification to 
build a model.  Sometimes these assumptions are radically false.  For example, in the 
social sciences it is not uncommon to assume non-communication among people or 
groups – an assumption of no organization.  In economics, it is standard to assume 
rationality.  Many models in physics use equilibrium assumptions or no-friction 
assumptions.  Often, these claims are trivial, merely allowing serious quantitative 
modelling of a genuine worldly phenomenon.  But once there is too much idealization, 
these are no longer accurate models of mechanisms.  They are too distant from the system 
they describe, and their parameters no longer have plausible physical interpretations.  
They might be useful predictive tools, or important explanatory work on the road to 
mechanism discovery.  Such models are often of further use as accurate descriptions of 
phenomena to be explained.  But scientists using such models are, as above, not yet in a 
position to know whether they have got hold of the actual mechanism. 
 
The level of idealization versus the level of accurate description is a matter of degree, so 
there is no particular point where such models cease to be accurate descriptions of 
mechanisms.  The crucial point is whether they accurately describe anything worldly, 
whether their parameters have reasonable physical values (see Bechtel and Wright).  
There may still be mechanisms in such cases – but such models have not yet described 
them.  This extends to many models in science. 
 
Case 3: No activities – Darden’s stopped clock 
 
Darden writes: ‘The MDC characterization of mechanism points to its operation.  
Although someone (perhaps Glennan 1996) might call a stopped clock, for example, a 
mechanism, I would not.  It is a machine, not a mechanism.  The MDC characterization 
views mechanisms as inherently active.  In the stopped clock, the entities are in place but 
not operating, not engaging in time-keeping activities.  When appropriate set-up 
conditions obtain (e.g., winding a spring, installing a battery), then the clock mechanism 
may operate.’ (Darden 2006 p280-1.) 
 
Recall that nothing is a mechanism tout court – mechanisms are mechanisms for 
phenomena.  A stopped clock is no longer a mechanism for telling the time, but it might 
still be a mechanism for something else – for recording a race time.  Recall also that for 
Darden, as for Machamer and Craver, activities must produce change.  The stopped clock 
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produces no change.  But we have argued that some activities and mechanisms, such as 
homeostatic ones, exist to prevent change.  So the stopped clock, and similar cases such 
as chimneys, or pillars supporting roofs, are candidate mechanisms for maintaining 
stability of some kind. 
 
However, they still present a puzzle: it seems they must either be mechanisms without 
activities, or non-mechanisms due to the lack of activities.  The normal explanation for a 
pillar supporting a roof involves only its material, spatio-temporal location and forces.  
This seems to involve organization and no activities.  But this is too quick, as there is no 
sharp line between activities and organization.  In one explanation, a high-level activity 
such as equilibrating might be the activity of a particular group of entities, while in 
another it is treated as the organization of the system.  Ultimately in such cases there is no 
sharp answer to the question of whether these are cases of mechanisms without activities, 
and there is no useful purpose in legislating an answer to the question that could constrain 
empirical research. 
 
Case 4: There is no organization 
 
There may appear to be no mechanism if there is no apparent organization.  In the kinetic 
theory of gases, which explains both Boyle’s Law and Charles’ Law, molecules behave 
on average randomly.7  But in our understanding of organization as when activities and 
entities each do something and do something together to produce the phenomenon, 
whatever relations amongst the activities and entities produces the phenomenon is the 
relevant organization.  If the molecules behaving randomly on average produces the 
phenomenon, that is the kind of organization present in that mechanism, however trivial 
it appears. 
 
This is not the same as the idealization case.  If a false assumption is made of average 
random behaviour to model a system, that might – or might not – render the model no 
longer a model of a mechanism, as we have said above.  But if the assumption is not 
false, a mechanism is being described. 
 
Case 5: There is nothing concrete 
 
Mathematicians sometimes speak of ‘mechanism’, for a technique or schematic method.  
These techniques are normally mechanisms for generating derivations or mathematical 
entities or structures.  For example, forcing is a mechanism for deriving the independence 
of the continuum hypothesis, and Foreman and Magidor (1995, p55) write of ‘the 
mechanism typically used to show presaturation’. 
 
The ‘mechanisms’ here are purely abstract.  They are not causes, and cannot be used in 
causal inference or explanation.  However, these things are used in explanation, 
prediction and control in the particular way appropriate to the abstract realm.  There is an 
analogous form of explanation in the decomposition to parts, and the understanding of 
how parts together produce the overall derivation, entity or structure.  They might also be 
                                                 
7  We thank Erik Weber for suggesting this example. 
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used to predict a change in the overall result from changing a part – a prediction that 
couldn’t be made before the decomposition. 
 
These strong analogies render using the word ‘mechanism’ reasonable.  To decide further 
whether these things count as mechanisms on our account depends on metaphysical 
issues we do not address here.  Do entities and activities have to be concrete?  If so, then 
these are not mechanisms, on most understandings of mathematical entities.  However, 
even on this view a mathematical Platonist might make a case for these being real 
mechanisms.  For our purposes it suffices to note that even in that case, there are clearly 
no causal mechanisms here. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We have argued for our characterization of mechanisms: 
‘A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such a 
way that they are responsible for the phenomenon.’ 
 
We have examined the various elements in some detail, showing how they apply to 
various fields, particularly astrophysical mechanisms.  However messy the process of 
mechanism discovery is, and however important the different challenges faced by 
different fields, this characterization lets us see how these three elements of mechanisms 
contribute to a project that shares a great deal across the sciences.  We hope that our 
account will be useful to ongoing debates on causal inference and causal modelling. 
 
We believe our account best captures a consensus emerging in the mechanisms literature 
by applying very widely to mechanisms while addressing the primary concerns of the 
main contenders in the debate. 
 
All the main contenders agree on the functional individuation of mechanisms – Glennan's 
Law.  Indeed, many have worked on the implications of this (Craver 2007 pp6 ff; Darden 
2006 p42, pp289-90; Bechtel 2006 p28). We have used this to frame our account, 
spelling out further implications, and there is no obvious reason for the main contenders 
to object.  We have already explained that our use of MDC's entity-activity language is 
not at serious odds with Glennan's or Bechtel's considered views.  Finally, there is little 
extended discussion of organization, so it is possible for the main contenders to regard 
our views on organization as a development of theirs. 
 
Bechtel, Craver, Darden and Machamer do not aim for a widely applicable account of a 
mechanism, but they should have no objection to that aim.  Craver and Bechtel are 
currently extending the applicability of mechanisms, at least to psychology and 
neuroscience.  They have no reason to object to dropping those elements of their own 
characterizations that narrow their applicability. 
 
Glennan does aim for a widely applicable account.  He wishes to use an account of 
mechanisms to give an account of causation, so his account of mechanisms must apply 
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anywhere there is causation.  But we have argued that Glennan's wish in earlier work for 
stability of mechanisms and mechanism parts, and his definition of mechanisms as 
'complex systems' narrow the applicability of his account.  This creates serious tension in 
Glennan’s work.  Glennan most of all has excellent reason to alter these elements of his 
own characterization in favour of an account like ours, which explains why he is now 
moving in that direction (2010, 2009b). 
 
In conclusion, we have offered a characterization of mechanisms that is widely applicable 
across the sciences and captures the emerging consensus on mechanisms.  It is fit for use 
as a framework for ongoing work on causal explanation, inference and modelling. 
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